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What is a theory according to the 
anthropological theory of the didactic?
Yves Chevallard1, Marianna Bosch2 and Sineae Kim1
1 Aix-Marseille University, Marseille, France, y.chevallard@free.fr
2 Ramon Llull University, IQS School of Management, Barcelona, Spain
The question tackled here centres on the notion—or, 
more precisely, the many notions—of theory often used 
in discussing scientific matters. The analysis that we 
attempt develops within the framework of the anthropo-
logical theory of the didactic (ATD). It purports to show 
that current usage refers mostly to the “emerged parts” 
of so-called theories and largely ignores their “immersed 
parts”, which are the correlate of their intrinsic implicit-
ness and historical incompleteness. This leads to favour 
open theorization over entrenched theory.
Keywords: Theorization, praxeology, knowledge, human 
activity, institutions.
INTRODUCING THE NOTION OF THEORY
In this study we examine the meaning and scope of 
a key concept of ATD which, paradoxically, since 
the inception of this theory, seems to have been con-
sistently overlooked: that of theory. A word akin to 
English “theory” exists in many European languag-
es [1]. According to John Ayto’s Dictionary of Words 
Origins (1990), the history of theory goes as follows:
theory [16] The etymological notion underly-
ing theory is of ‘looking’; only secondarily did it 
develop via ‘contemplation’ to ‘mental concep-
tion.’ It comes via late Latin theōria from Greek 
theōríā ‘contemplation, speculation, theory.’ This 
was a derivative of theōrós ‘spectator,’ which was 
formed from the base thea- (source also of theā́st-
hai ‘watch, look at,’·from which English gets thea-
tre). Also derived from theōrós was theōreīń ‘look 
at,’ which formed the basis of theṓrēma ‘specula-
tion, intuition, theory,’ acquired by English via 
late Latin theōrēma as theorem [16]. From the same 
source comes theoretical [17]. (p. 527)
A paper by a classical scholar, Ian Rutherford, gives 
more information on the uses of the word theoria in 
Ancient Greece:
The Greek word theoria means “watching,” and 
has two special senses in Greek culture: first, 
a religious delegation sent by a Greek city, to 
consult an oracle or take part in a festival at a 
sanctuary outside its territory, and second, philo-
sophical contemplation. Theoria in the first sense 
is attested from the sixth century bce until the 
Roman Empire, but the sources are particularly 
rich in the Hellenistic period. Sacred delegates 
were called theoroi, were often led by a so-called 
architheoros, and if they went by sea, the vehicle 
was a theoris-ship. (Abstract)
The first of these two senses has almost disappeared 
from modern usage. The second sense opened the 
way for our common uses of theory. In the following, 
we concentrate on “modern” meanings of this word, 
which dictionaries usually condense into a small 
number of categories, as does for example the English 
Wiktionary. The entry dedicated to theory in this dic-
tionary begins classically with the etymology of the 
word, then passes on to the uses of it that it does retain:
theory (countable and uncountable, plural the-
ories)
1) (obsolete) Mental conception; reflection, con-
sideration. [16th-18th c.]
2) (sciences) A coherent statement or set of 
ideas that explains observed facts or phe-
nomena, or which sets out the laws and 
principles of something known or observed; 
a hypothesis confirmed by observation, ex-
periment etc. [from 17th c.] 
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3) (uncountable) The underlying principles or 
methods of a given technical skill, art etc., as 
opposed to its practice. [from 17th c.]
4) (mathematics) A field of study attempting to 
exhaustively describe a particular class of 
constructs. [from 18th c.] Knot theory classi-
fies the mappings of a circle into 3-space.
5) A hypothesis or conjecture. [from 18th c.]
6) (countable, logic) A set of axioms together 
with all statements derivable from them. 
Equivalently, a formal language plus a set of 
axioms (from which can then be derived the-
orems). A theory is consistent if it has a model.
In what follows we shall draw upon such semantic 
summaries in order to suggest that the notion of the-
ory developed in ATD can account for the diversity 
of usages that exist today.
SOME BASICS OF ATD
In ATD, the basic “entities” are persons x and insti-
tutions I. These notions are close to their ordinary 
counterparts, although they are more general: in ATD, 
a newborn infant is a person; and, to take just one 
easy example, a class, with its students and teachers, 
is an institution. An institution I comprises different 
positions p— in the case of a class, that of student and of 
teacher. To every person x or institutional position p 
is assigned a “praxeological equipment”, which is the 
system of “capacities” that, under appropriate condi-
tions, enables the person x or any person x’ occupying 
position p to act and think through one’s actions.
Any praxeological equipment, be it personal or posi-
tional, is made up of, among other things, “notions”. 
Most persons and institutional positions thus have 
a certain notion of theory—if only through the over-
used phrase “in theory”. The present study could then 
be said to be partly about the notion of theory in ATD 
(taken as an institution). However that may be, it is 
essential to detach oneself from the seemingly undis-
puted belief that there would exist a unique, shared 
notion of theory of which the meaning would simply 
vary according to the context of use. In ATD, every 
person, every institutional position is supposed to be 
endowed with a peculiar notion of theory, that notion 
being shaped by the constraints to which the person or 
position is currently subjected. This phenomenon is at 
the origin of the processes of institutional transposi-
tion, of which didactic transposition is but a particular 
case (Chevallard, 1992). In order to make headway, we 
shall now delineate the “anthropological” notion of 
theory—which, at the start, is only one such notion 
amongst others.
THE NOTION OF PRAXEOLOGY IN ATD
ATD posits a theory of human activity that hinges on 
an essential and founding notion: that of praxeology 
(Chevallard, 2006, 2015; see also Bosch & Gascón, 2014). 
The word praxeology has been around for (at least) two 
centuries in the sense recorded by most dictionaries, 
in which it is held to refer to the “study of human ac-
tion and conduct”, to the “study of practical or efficient 
activity”, or to the “science of efficient action”. The use 
made here of the word pertains properly to ATD and 
departs decisively from this old-established, though 
infrequent, use. A key tenet of ATD is that when a 
person x acts purposely and knowingly, her doings 
can be analysed into a (finite) sequence of tasks t1, t2, 
..., tn. Contrary to the common meaning of the term 
(which has a ring of unpleasantness about it), task is 
taken here in a very general sense, irrespective of its 
volume or pettiness: to open this door and to smile to 
this neighbour are tasks; to scratch this person’s back, 
to write this sonnet, to save this polar bear, to prove this 
theorem, and to play this guitar chord are tasks as well. 
Any task t is regarded as a “specimen” of a type of tasks 
T. In order to execute the task t of type T, a person x 
draws on a determined technique, denoted τT, that is 
to say a (more or less precise) way of accomplishing 
(at least some) tasks t of type T. No technique τ can 
cope with the totality of tasks of a given type T—its 
range of success is usually called the scope of τ. If, for 
example, it is clear that elementary techniques for 
factoring numbers all have a limited scope, it is true 
also, for obvious reasons, that any technique whatso-
ever eventually reaches its limits.
Let us take another example, that of a technique for 
finding the quotient of number a by number b (with 
a, b ∈ ℕ*), which we make explicit on a specimen. 
Considering that 12 = 2 × 2 × 3, in order to arrive at the 
quotient of 417 by 12, we first determine the quotient of 
417 by 2, which is the quotient of 416 by 2, i.e. 208. We 
then calculate the quotient of 208 by 2, which is simply 
104; and finally we determine the quotient of 104 by 3, 
which is the same as the quotient of 102 by 3, or 34. The 
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quotient of 417 divided by 12 is “therefore” 34. (Indeed, 
417 = 34 × 12 + 9.) The inverted commas that surround 
therefore hint at the fact that many people—including 
mathematics teachers—will highly doubt the validity 
of this technique, on the grounds that it leads one to 
carelessly get rid of successive remainders. This paves 
the way for another key notion that ATD hinges on: the 
notion of technology. This word is used in ATD with 
its etymological value: as the suffix -logy indicates, a 
technology is a “discourse” on a given technique τ. 
This discourse is supposed, at least in the best-case 
scenario, both to justify the technique τ as a valid way 
of performing tasks t of type T and to throw light on 
the logic and workings of that technique, making it 
at least partially intelligible to the user. As concerns 
the technique of division shown above, it seems diffi-
cult to hit upon a full-fledged technology that would 
justify it, let alone explain it—if the technique is duly 
valid, why is it so? For lack of space, we shall leave 
these two mathematical tasks—justify and explain the 
aforementioned technique—to the perplexed reader.
A key point must be stressed. Owing to the presence 
of the suffix -logy, the word technology carries with it 
the idea of a rational discourse (about some tekhne—a 
Greek word meaning “a system or method of making 
or doing”, that is, a technique or system of techniques). 
In the universe of ATD, there is no such thing as uni-
versal rationality. Every person x, every institution I, 
and every position p has its own rationality, afford-
ed by the technologies present in its “praxeological 
equipment.” Of course, persons and institutions strive 
to indulge their “rationality” or even to impose it upon 
others. The interplay between competing rationalities 
is a major aspect of what it is the mission of didactics 
to explore.
We have now arrived at a crossroads. It appears that 
no technological justification is self-sufficient: it relies 
on elements of knowledge of a higher level of gen-
erality, which, whenever they do not go unnoticed—
they often do—, sound more abstract, more ethereal, 
oftentimes abstruse, as if they expressed the point 
of view of a far removed, pure spectator—a theoros. 
In ATD, such items of knowledge, sometimes dubbed 
“principles” (or “postulates”, etc.), compose the theory 
that goes with the triple formed by the type of tasks T, 
technique τ, and technology. This theoretical compo-
nent is denoted by the letter Θ (“big theta”) while the 
technology is denoted by (small) θ . We thus arrive at 
a quadruple traditionally denoted by [T / τ / θ / Θ]. It 
is this quadruple that we call a praxeology; it is called 
a punctual praxeology because it is organised around 
the type of tasks T, considered as a “point”.
It should be clear that, by its very definition, ATD’s 
notion of theory already subsumes case 3 of the 
English Wiktionary’s definition of theory: “The un-
derlying principles or methods of a given technical 
skill, art etc., as opposed to its practice. [from 17th 
c.].” Let us take a step forward. A central tenet of ATD 
is that all “knowledge” can be modelled in terms of 
praxeologies. The “praxeological equipment” of a 
person x or institutional position p is defined to be 
the more or less integrated system of all the praxe-
ologies that the person x or a person x’ in position 
p can draw upon to do what this person is led to do. 
A praxeology can be denoted by the letter ℘ (called 
“Weierstrass p”). It can be construed as the union of 
two parts or “blocks”: the praxis part Π = [T / τ], also 
called the practico-technical block, and the logos part 
Λ = [θ / Θ] or technologico-theoretical block. One can 
write: ℘ = Π ⊕ Λ = [T / τ] ⊕ [θ / Θ] = [T / τ / θ / Θ]. The 
operation ⊕ is sometimes called the amalgamation 
of the praxis and logos parts. The amalgamation of Π 
and Λ should be interpreted as a dialectic process of 
“sublation” [2] through which the praxis and logos parts 
are at the same time negated as isolated parts but pre-
served as partial elements in a synthesis, which is the 
praxeology ℘. Let us for a moment relabel “knowledge 
part” the logos part and “know-how part” the prax-
is part of a praxeology ℘. The dialectic sublation of 
“knowledge” and “know-how” that ℘ is supposed to 
achieve is hardly ever actualized. More often than 
not, the praxis and the logos observable in a person’s 
or institutional position’s praxeological equipment do 
not fit well together. The praxis block may be poorly 
developed while the logos part seems to be ahead of 
the game—a state of things often expressed by saying 
something like “he knows the theory, but can’t apply 
it.” Or the praxis part seems to be going smoothly but 
the logos part is so poor that it fails to substantially 
explain or justify the featured technique, which is 
consequently turned into a mere “recipe.” The failure 
to arrive at a “well-balanced” praxeology is the rule, 
not the exception—a key phenomenon that we will 
now dwell upon.
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INCOMPLETENESS AND IMPLICITNESS 
IN PRAXEOLOGIES
When it comes to discussing praxeological matters, 
people are prone to using metonymies or, more pre-
cisely, synecdoches [3]. This synecdochic bent general-
ly selects as a derived name some (supposedly) “noble” 
part or feature of the thing to name. The widely shared 
propensity to metonymize shows up in particular in 
the use of the word knowledge—which is the “lofty” 
part of a praxeology—to name the whole praxeology. It 
is even more manifest in the generalized use of theory 
as including not only what ATD calls technology, but 
also the praxis part and, therefore, the whole praxe-
ological matter. In common parlance, theory refers 
usually, though somewhat fuzzily, to a complex of 
praxeologies sharing a common “theory” (in a sense 
acknowledged by the naming institutions). Such a 
“body of knowledge” can be denoted by the formula 
[Tij / τij / θi / Θ] with i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., mi, where 
the theory Θ “governs” all the technologies θi, each 
technology θi “governing” in turn the techniques τij. 
Such a praxeology goes by the name of global praxe-
ology. It is this generic analysis that ATD offers when 
one comes to speak of, for instance, “group theory” or 
“number theory” or “chaos theory” or “knot theory,” 
etc. It is to be observed that, in doing so, the praxe-
ological complex to which one refers is defined “in 
intension” rather than “in extension.” It allows one to 
identify conceptually the possible content of the prax-
eological complex, while its real “extension” remains 
somewhat unspecified. Of course, it is risky to be so 
unmethodical when it comes to describing praxeolog-
ical organisations. Naming a part to mean the whole 
leads to forget or neglect other parts. Therefore, the 
resulting praxeologies cannot be efficient tools for 
action—just as a car stripped down to the engine is 
of little avail to travel (even if, again metonymically, 
“motor” can be used to refer to the whole car).
This is however one aspect only of the problem of 
incompleteness in praxeologies. Any praxeology 
whatsoever can be said to be incomplete, be it tech-
nically, technologically or theoretically. And it is the 
fate of all praxeologies to continually go through a 
process which can further the development of any of 
their constituent parts: the technique can be further 
“technicized”, the technology “technologized”, and the 
theory “theorized”. Consider the following easy exam-
ple relating to the century-old “rule of three”, that of 
the so-called “unitary method”, which L. C. Pascoe in 
his Arithmetic (1971) introduces as “helpful to those 
who initially have difficulties with the ideas of ratios” 
(p. 64). Traditional arithmetical techniques were es-
sentially oral: to do mathematics, one had to say some-
thing, in order to arrive at the sought-for result. For 
instance, if it is known that 132 tickets cost £165, how 
much will be paid for 183 tickets? The right “saying” 
goes somewhat as follows [4]: “If 132 tickets cost £165, 
then 1 ticket costs 132 times less, or £ 165132 ; and 183 tick-
ets cost 183 times more, or £ 165132  × 183, that is £228.75.” 
Here the type of tasks T is clearly delineated; and so 
is the propounded technique τ0. As is often the case 
with arithmetic, the technology θ of τ is essentially 
embodied in the “technical discourse” above, that both 
activates τ and explains—makes plain—its logic, there-
by justifying it. As always, the “justifying efficacy” of 
θ depends much on the apparent “naturalness” of the 
supposedly self-evident reasoning conveyed by the 
technical discourse recited (if n cost p, then 1 costs p/n, 
etc.). There exist, of course, other techniques. Some 
centuries ago, people would have said something like 
“132 is to 165 as 183 is to price p”, writing down the 
“proportion” 132:165::183:p. Using the (technological) 
assertion that, in such a proportion, the product of the 
“means” (i.e. 165 and 183) equals the product of the “ex-
tremes” (i.e. 132 and p), they would have arrived at the 
equation 165 × 183 = 132 × p, which gives p =  165 × 183132 . This 
formula appears to agree with the one found using 
τ0, provided one knows the (technological) equality 
a × c
b  = 
a
b  × c. But this age-old technique τ–1 was techno-
logically—not technically—more demanding, because 
the reason why the key technological assertion (about 
means and extremes) is true remains hidden—which, 
for most users, turns τ–1 into a recipe.
The technique τ0 can be modified in (at least) two 
subtly different ways. One consists in introducing 
an easy technological notion from daily life, that of 
unit price, which leads to a technical variant of τ0: “If 
132 tickets cost £165, then 1 ticket costs 132 times less, 
or £ 165132 , that is £1.25; and m tickets will cost m times 
more, or £1.25 × m.” This technical variant τ01 is a little 
bit more complex technically (by contrast, τ0 skips the 
calculation of the unit price, though the technological 
concept of unit price is already implicitly present); 
but it provides more technological comfort to the lay-
man. Another variant results from a decisive theo-
retical change. While people generally understand 
the expression “number of times” as referring to a 
whole number of times, as was the case in the tickets 
problem, a major advance in the history of numbers 
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consisted in regarding fractions as true numbers, on 
a par with what came to be called natural numbers—
fractional numbers being called by contrast artificial 
numbers. A second step forward, not yet taken by so 
many people, consists in extending the scope of the 
expression “number of times” to include fractional 
numbers, so that, for instance, 183 is 183132  times 132 (i.e. 
183 = 132 ×  183132 ), from which it follows that the price 
of 183 tickets is 183132  times the price of 132 tickets, or 
183
132  times £165, that is £165 × 
183
132  (which is yet another 
resolvent). As long as one accepts to think in terms of 
fractional number of times, we have a new technique, 
τ02, much more powerful and comfortable than τ0 or 
τ01. Knowing for instance that the price of 2988 tickets 
is £3735, we can now say that the price of 2012 tickets 
will be 20122988 times the price of 2988 tickets, i.e. £3735 × 
2012
2988; etc. While the variation leading to τ01 only called 
for a rather easy modification in the technique’s tech-
nological environment, here the change affects the the-
ory itself, which in turn leads to a new technological 
concept, that of a fractional number of times.
In mathematics as well as the sciences, praxeologies 
turn out to be no less incomplete than in other fields 
of human activity. Many aspects of a praxeology’s 
incompleteness are in fact linked to the impression 
of “naturalness” that so many people feel when they 
use (or even observe) this praxeology. Of course, the 
notion of naturalness undergoes institutional varia-
tions—let alone personal interpretations. But it is too 
often assumed that what is natural is, by definition, an 
unalterable given that does not have to be “justified.” 
This, of course, runs contrary to the scientific tradi-
tion, of which it is the ambition to unveil the figments 
of institutional or personal imagination. Thus the 
French mathematician Henri Poincaré (1902, p. 74) 
regarded the principle of mathematical induction as 
“imposed upon us with such a force that we could not 
conceive of a contrary proposition.” However, almost 
at the same time, progress in mathematics showed that 
this supposedly self-existent principle could be de-
rived from the well-ordering principle [4]. The same 
phenomenon had happened more than two centuries 
earlier. The leading character was then John Wallis. 
According to Fauvel, Flood, and Wilson (2013), here 
is what happened:
On the evening of 11 July 1663, he lectured in 
Oxford on Euclid’s parallel postulate, and pre-
sented a seductive argument purporting to 
derive it from Euclid’s other axioms. As Wallis 
observed, his argument assumes that similar fig-
ures can take different sizes. Wallis found this as-
sumption very plausible, and if it were true then 
the parallel postulate would be a consequence 
of the other axioms of Euclid. It does, however, 
imply a remarkable result: in any geometry in 
which the parallel postulate does not hold, that 
similar figures would have to be identical in size 
as well as in shape, and so scale copies could never 
be made. (pp. 129–130)
Seventy years later, Girolamo Saccheri was to observe 
that Wallis “needed only to assume the existence of 
two triangles, whose angles were equal each to each 
and sides unequal” (Bonola, 1955, p. 29). Wallis’s proof 
of the parallel postulate [5] opened the way to a major 
change that we can subsume under a broader histori-
cal pattern. By making explicit a theoretical property 
of Euclidean space—“To every figure there exists a 
similar figure of arbitrary magnitude” (Bonola, 1955, 
p. 15)—, Wallis reduced the incompleteness (in ATD’s 
sense) of Euclidean geometry as a praxeological field. 
But he contributed much more to the mathematical 
sciences: he discovered a constraint that, until then, 
had been taken for granted (and thus ignored) and 
which turned out to be crucial in the development 
of geometry, in that it drew a clear demarcation line 
between Euclidean geometry and the yet to come 
non-Euclidean geometries.
At this point, we must introduce another key notion 
of ATD: that of condition, stealthily used in the be-
havioural sciences (through the idea of conditioning 
or being conditioned) and akin to more widespread 
notions such as cause, variable, and factor. Didactics 
is defined in ATD as the science of the conditions of 
diffusion of knowledge to persons and within insti-
tutions. More generally, ATD views any science—in-
cluding mathematics—as studying a certain kind 
of conditions with a bearing on human life and its 
environments. In this respect, given an institution-
al position p, it is usual (and useful) to distinguish, 
among the set of conditions considered, those that 
could be modified by the people occupying position 
p, and those which cannot be altered by these people 
(though they could be modified by those in some po-
sition p’ ≠ p). Any science seeks to accrue knowledge 
and know-how in order to make the most of prevailing 
conditions and, in the case of constraints, to create 
new positions for which these constraints become 
modifiable conditions. Now, before doing so, it is nec-
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essary to identify such conditions and constraints, and 
this is precisely what happens in the Wallis episode, 
where the Euclidean constraint of invariance by sim-
ilarity is brought out as a key theoretical property. 
At the same time, revealing some constraint usually 
brings forth alternative conditions that had gone un-
noticed until then—non-Euclideanism, in the case at 
hand—and which become new objects of study. It must 
be stressed here that a science does not know in ad-
vance the complete set of conditions and constraints it 
has to cope with: constructing this set is, by nature, a 
never-ending task. All these considerations extend to 
any field of activity, whose praxeological equipments 
are the outcomes of facing sui generis conditions and 
constraints. We have now arrived at a position where 
it makes sense to revert to the question from which 
we started.
WHAT IS A THEORY?
It must be emphasized here that the interrelated no-
tions of technique, technology and theory do not refer 
so much to “things” as to functions. A technique is a 
construct which, under appropriate conditions, per-
forms a determined function—the technical function. 
The same may be said about technology and theory, 
which respectively perform the technological and 
theoretical functions. Up to a point, these last two 
functions look weakly distinguishable—indeed, any 
contrastive definition is sure to be plagued with coun-
terexamples. Obviously, there are some general cri-
teria allowing one to discern the technological from 
the theoretical: the first of them is regarded as more 
concrete, more specific and straightforward, while 
the second one is approached as being more abstract, 
more general, more meditative and far-fetched, as if 
it were reminiscent of its origins. In addition, as has 
been already highlighted, in an intellectual tradition 
that has persisted to this day, the second one is valued 
more highly than the other is. However, these consid-
erations may impede the recognition of an essential 
phenomenon: the use which is often made of words 
like theory refers to the explicit aspects of an entity 
which we described as definitely subjected to inex-
plicitness and incompleteness.
From the point of view of ATD, it appears that the 
technological and theoretical components of a prax-
eological organisation—that is to say, its logos part—
are almost always misidentified, because the usual 
view of them tends to focus on their “explicit” part, 
which looks generally pretentious and assumptive. 
This tendency clearly shows through the case 2 of the 
definition of theory given by the English Wiktionary: 
“(sciences) A coherent statement or set of ideas that 
explains observed facts or phenomena, or which sets 
out the laws and principles of something known or ob-
served.” This of course is representative of a dominant 
theory about... theories. Moreover, theory is often lib-
erally used to label what boils down to a few guidelines 
or precepts which, taken together, do not function as 
the theory of any clearly identified object; for a theory 
should always be a theory of something, built around 
the scientific ambition to study this “something”.
The metonymic use of theory is no problem in itself: 
when one says that ATD is a theory of “the didactic”, 
theory refers, as is usual in mathematics for example, 
to the whole of a praxeological field. But it is a symp-
tom of our propensity to give the word free rein with 
the uneasy consequence that the debate on theory is 
deprived of its object. By contrast, ATD conduces to fo-
cus the research effort on examining the implicit, un-
assuming or even wanting parts of technologies and 
theories. It then appears that a theory is made up of 
two main components, that we may call its “emerged 
part” and “immersed part”. To avoid engaging here in 
a titanic work, we summarize in two points the con-
stant lesson that praxeological analysis consistently 
teaches us. Firstly, the immersed part of a theory—in 
mathematics and, as far as we know, elsewhere—is re-
plete with inexplicit tenets that are necessary to keep 
the emerged part afloat. Secondly, these tenets have 
surreptitious, far-reaching consequences, which of-
ten go unnoticed and usually unexplained at both the 
technological and the technical levels. What people do 
and how they do it owes much to “thoughts” unknown 
to them—unknown, not unknowable.
In ATD a theory is thus a hypothetical reality that as-
sumes the form of a (necessarily fuzzy) set of explicit 
and implicit statements about the object of the theory. 
A theory is in truth the current state of a dialectic pro-
cess of theorisation of which it offers an instantaneous 
and partial view that may prove delusive. The study 
and exploration of a theory is tantamount to further-
ing the very process of theorisation. One main feature 
of this process is that it allows for the expansion of too 
often ad hoc, punctual praxeologies [T / τ / θ / Θ] into 
deeply-rooted global praxeologies [Tij / τij / θi / Θ]. The 
process of theorisation, as well as the networking of 
theorisations, has thus a liberating effect, in which, by 
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the way, the use of well-chosen terms and symbolic no-
tations helps achieve mental hygiene and theoretical 
clarity in bringing about what Bachelard once called 
the asceticism of abstract thought.
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ENDNOTES
1. See for instance the list proposed on the page at 
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/eng-
lish/theory.
2. The word sublation is the traditional rendering in 
English of Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung. According to 
Wikipedia (“Aufheben”, n.d.), “in sublation, a term or 
concept is both preserved and changed through its 
dialectical interplay with another term or concept. 
Sublation is the motor by which the dialectic func-
tions.”
3. A synecdoche is a phrase in which a part of some-
thing is used in order to refer to the whole of it.
4. See at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_
induction#Equivalence_with_the_well-ordering_prin-
ciple
5. For Wallis’s proof in modern form, see, for example, 
Martin, 1975, pp. 273–274.
